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1. Introduction 
This paper examines early warning of, and political re-
sponses to, mass atrocities in East Timor in the late 
1970s. It begins with an historical synopsis that exam-
ines the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. It shows 
that Indonesia’s three year military campaign to crush 
the East Timorese resistance resulted in mass deaths 
due to famine and disease. It then considers the United 
Nations’ response to the unfolding crisis. It goes on to 
evaluate the level of international awareness of the 
humanitarian crisis in East Timor by inspecting con-
temporaneous eyewitness reports by foreign diplo-
mats. In doing so, it shows that there was early warn-
ing and ongoing knowledge of the mass deaths in East 
Timor; that states chose not to act to terminate the 
deaths; that they instead provided military and diplo-
matic assistance to Indonesia. The paper examines two 
different efforts by civil society activists to bring an end 
to the mass deaths. 
2. Pre-Invasion East Timor  
The Democratic Republic of East Timor consists of the 
eastern half of the island of Timor, as well as the en-
clave of Oecussi (located in West Timor) and two 
smaller islands, Atauro and Jaco. It has an area of ap-
proximately 15,000 square kilometres, which is slightly 
larger than Northern Ireland. The western half of the 
island is part of the Indonesian province of Nusa 
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Tenggara Timur (the East Lesser Sundas).  
Claimed by Portugal as a colonial possession in the 
17th century, East Timor remained under Portuguese 
rule until the 20th century. For much of the 20th cen-
tury Portugal itself was under the rule of western Eu-
rope’s most enduring authoritarian system―the fascist 
Estado Novo, which opposed decolonisation for any of 
its colonies, including East Timor. On 25 April 1974, a 
group of Portuguese military officers known as the 
Armed Forces Movement overthrew the regime, dis-
banded the paramilitary forces, eliminated censorship 
and abolished the secret police. The new government 
formally accepted the terms of the 1960 UN Resolution 
on Decolonisation. East Timor became a non-
autonomous territory under Portuguese administration 
and placed on the UN’s decolonisation agenda.  
Indonesia had not shown much interest in annexing 
East Timor during its own independence struggle in the 
1940s. Nor did it show much interest during its liberal 
parliamentary period in the 1950s. Its Foreign Affairs 
Minister explicitly denied any claim to East Timor in his 
submissions to the First Committee of the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1961. However, once Portugal 
committed East Timor to a decolonisation process, lead-
ing Indonesian officials took the view that decolonisation 
should result in East Timor being annexed to Indonesia. 
Australia’s Prime Minister advised Indonesia’s Presi-
dent Suharto that he was “in favour of incorporation 
but obeisance has to be made to self determination”1. 
An Indonesian official later remarked that “until Mr 
Whitlam’s visit to Jakarta they had been undecided 
about Timor. However the Prime Minister’s support for 
the idea of incorporation into Indonesia had helped 
them to crystallise their own thinking and they were 
now firmly convinced of the wisdom of this course”2.  
3. The Indonesian Invasion of East Timor 
Inside East Timor, the two most popular political organi-
sations were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT― 
União Democratica Timorense) and the Timorese Social 
Democratic Association (ASDT―Associacao Social 
Democratica Timorense), which changed its name to 
FRETILIN―the Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste In-
dependente) in September 1974. FRETILIN and UDT 
agreed that East Timor should become independent, 
and that they would form a transitional government. 
They formed a political coalition in early 1975 to that 
effect. However, their mutual suspicion proved to be 
                                                          
1 NAA: A11443 [1]: South-East Asia Branch, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), loose papers on Portuguese 
Timor: July-September 1974. 
2 NAA: A10005, 202/1/3, iii: DFAT Correspondence files, Por-
tuguese Timor: negotiations and constitutional develop-
ments. 
too strong, and their political inexperience was exploited 
by Indonesia, which sought to undermine potential East 
Timorese unity by playing off one side against the other.  
The FRETILIN-UDT coalition collapsed after four 
months. Indonesian intelligence advised UDT leaders 
that FRETILIN was planning a coup, and that Indonesia 
would respect East Timor’s right of self-determination 
if UDT moved against FRETILIN. Accordingly, key UDT 
members led a preemptive coup against FRETILIN in 
the early hours of 11 August 1975. FRETILIN fought 
back on 20 August, defeating most of the UDT forces 
by 30 August. Between 1,500 and 3,000 people are es-
timated to have been killed during the internal armed 
conflict. The Portuguese governor and his administra-
tion left the mainland for the off-shore island of Atau-
ro, and later proceeded to Portugal. The defeated forc-
es of UDT, now located in West Timor, signed a 
petition calling for the integration of East Timor into 
Indonesia.  
Indonesia accelerated its campaign of destabilisa-
tion and terror, and ultimately launched a full-scale 
military invasion on 7 December 1975 in order to de-
feat FRETILIN in battle, eliminate its leaders and sup-
press political organizations associated with it. Within 
two months, all major population centres were in In-
donesian hands. By June 1976, there were approxi-
mately 32,000 combat troops in 28 battalions, sup-
ported by some 3,000 Timorese partisans and civil 
defence personnel3. Indonesia intended to integrate 
East Timor as its 27th province on 17 August 1976, its 
own independence day, but the Australian govern-
ment, which wanted to recognise the takeover, said 
privately that 17 August “involved them in particular 
embarrassment as it is the day on which [Australia’s] 
Parliament is to reassemble”4. Accordingly, Indonesia 
brought the date forward by one month, and an-
nounced the integration on 17 July 1976, during the 
Australian Parliamentary recess.  
FRETILIN’s leaders reorganized the party’s national 
civilian and military structures in order to undertake a 
protracted guerrilla war. At a conference in Soibada (15 
May–2 June 1976), they divided the areas outside di-
rect Indonesian military control, known as liberated 
zones, into six sectors, and placed each one under mili-
tary and political command. The reorganisation paid 
dividends as many local villagers joined the armed re-
sistance, which took advantage of Indonesian security 
lapses to harass outposts and ambush supply convoys. 
East Timor’s arterial roads were severely degraded by 
the heavy Indonesian military traffic and by monsoonal 
rains that caused major landslides. Indonesia’s military 
logisticians were unable to cope. Combat units were 
                                                          
3 NAA: A13685, 1/1978: The Indonesian integration of East 
Timor.  
4 British Archives file FCO 24/2208: Political Relations be-
tween Australia and Indonesia. 
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unable to receive timely resupplies, and Indonesia’s 15 
infantry and marine battalions could do little more 
than conduct small-scale local patrols5.  
By December 1976, FRETILIN had managed to hold 
the Indonesian forces to a military stalemate. It was 
able to organize a functioning society in the mountains. 
It could provide enough food crops and basic health 
care to the many tens of thousands of civilians who 
had accompanied them there. The Indonesian general 
elections in May 1977 necessitated the redeployment 
of 14,000 combat troops from East Timor to other 
parts of Indonesia for pre-election security.6 By pre-
venting Indonesia’s military commanders from re-
gaining the initiative, the elections gave FRETILIN the 
opportunity to recruit, retrain and reorganize.  
4. Airpower after May 1977  
Indonesia resumed military operations after the May 
1977 elections. Its strategy was based on the assess-
ment that it had to eliminate FRETILIN by the end of 
January 1978 because heavy rains would force opera-
tions to cease then―just as they had at the end of Jan-
uary 1977. It wanted to deny FRETILIN another oppor-
tunity to regroup, recruit and retrain. Starting in August 
1977, it deployed OV-10F Bronco aircraft that it had 
acquired from the USA. The significance of the Bronco 
was that it could be operated from the most rudimen-
tary airfields, and its slow flying speed meant that it 
could identify and attack villages more effectively. It 
had been designed specifically for such operations.  
The air power offensives targeted agricultural areas 
and other food sources such as livestock in the liberat-
ed zones, where the population lived alongside 
FRETILIN, and the support bases, which surrounded the 
liberated zones. The Indonesian Air Force used napalm, 
which it had acquired from the USSR in 1962 (CAVR, 
2006, 7.5). According to survivors who testified before 
East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Rec-
onciliation: 
The army burned the tall grass. The fire would 
spread quickly, and the whole area would be ablaze 
as if it had been doused in gasoline. Those of us 
who were surrounded didn’t have time to escape 
because the flames were so big. Their strategy 
trapped many people….After we got out, I could 
still see the old people who had been left behind by 
their families. They were in a sitting position. The 
men put on new clothes, hung belak [crescent-
shaped metal chest-ornament worn around the 
neck] on their necks and wore caibauk [crescent-
                                                          
5 NAA: A13685, 1/1978: The Indonesian integration of East 
Timor. 
6 NAA: A13685, 1/1978: The Indonesian integration of East 
Timor. 
shape crown]. The women had put on gold earrings 
and gold necklaces, prepared their konde [tradi-
tional way of styling hair] and wore black veils as if 
they were going to mass. We just looked at them 
but couldn’t do anything. The enemy was still after 
us (CAVR, 2006, 7.3). 
5. Famine, Disease and Mass Deaths 
Illness and food shortages forced civilians to leave the 
hills and make their way to Indonesian forces in order 
to surrender. The surrendering population was first de-
tained in transit camps and later dispatched to reset-
tlement camps. Transit camps were located in close 
proximity to the local military bases. Their function was 
to enable the Indonesian military to identify members 
of the resistance and to gain intelligence on the rest of 
the resistance in the mountains. East Timorese collabo-
rators helped the Indonesian military to identify mem-
bers of the resistance in the transit camps. Sometimes 
these collaborators identified people who were not 
connected to the resistance but against whom they 
had held grudges prior to the invasion.  
Torture and rape were common during the interro-
gation process (CAVR, 2006, 7.3, 7.7, 7.8; Fernandes, 
2011, pp. 48-49). People identified as belonging to 
Fretilin or its armed wing were either executed imme-
diately or interrogated at greater length and then exe-
cuted. Female relatives of Fretilin leaders were often 
made the sexual slaves of Indonesian military officers. 
At the conclusion of their posting to East Timor, offic-
ers frequently transferred their “ownership rights” 
over these women to other officers. Women who had 
connections to the resistance or who were believed to 
know the location of members of the resistance were 
forced to help the Indonesian military in its search and 
destroy missions. They were often subjected to torture 
and rape during these missions.  
The transit camps were not equipped to care for 
the welfare of the surrendering population. Often they 
were little more than huts made from palm thatch with 
no toilets. In many cases, the only shelter in the camps 
was under trees. No medical care was available. Since 
the detainees’ food sources had been destroyed and 
they had walked for days in order to surrender, they 
were already in a weakened state when they arrived at 
the transit camps. Diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea 
and tuberculosis ensured that most people who were 
sick died. Detainees were forbidden to grow or search 
for food themselves but were given a small amount of 
food on arrival. This food was often distributed after 
extorting family heirlooms, jewelry, traditional beads 
or sexual favours. In some cases, the detainees went 
into protein shock after eating the food, resulting in 
“chills, fever, bronchial spasms, acute emphysema, 
vomiting and diarrhoea.” (CAVR, 2006, 7.3).  
After a period of three months (the exact duration 
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in each camp depended on the prevailing policy there), 
the detainees were dispatched to resettlement camps. 
Sometimes they were not sent anywhere; the same 
transit camps were re-designated as resettlement 
camps. According to a secret submission to the Austral-
ian cabinet in November 1979, “about 200,000 people 
were in these centres in early September 1979”7. Other 
estimates of the population in these camps range from 
approximately 300,000 to 370,000 people by late 1979 
(Taylor, 1991, pp. 88-90). Whatever the true figure, it 
should be remembered that the population of East Ti-
mor at the time of the Indonesian invasion in 1975 was 
about 650,000 (Staveteig, 2007, p. 14). Once again, 
there were severe restrictions on movement as well as 
inadequate food, medicine, sanitation and shelter. The 
result was a famine in which many tens of thousands of 
East Timorese died.  
A demographical analysis in 2006 concluded that 
“Even under the most conservative assumptions, the 
total number of excess deaths in East Timor during the 
entire period of Indonesian occupation likely ranges 
from 150,000 to 220,000” (Staveteig, 2006). According 
to a revised version of this analysis, “it is likely that 
204,000 is a conservative upper-bound estimate on ex-
cess mortality. The ‘true’ number of East Timorese who 
died because of the Indonesian occupation may never 
be known” (Staveteig, 2007). The overwhelming major-
ity of the deaths occurred during the famine, whose 
most deadly phase occurred during a 19-month period 
in 1978 and 1979 (CAVR, 2006, p. 505).  
6. Responses by the United Nations  
Immediately after the invasion, the United Nations 
General Assembly strongly deplored Indonesia’s mili-
tary intervention in Resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 De-
cember 1975, and stated that East Timor had the right 
to self-determination. The UN Security Council also 
confirmed East Timor’s right to self-determination in 
Resolutions 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975 and 389 
of 22 April 1976. Neither the General Assembly nor the 
Security Council, however, used the words “invasion”, 
“aggression” or “condemn” in connection with Indone-
sia’s actions. Nor was Indonesia’s use of force charac-
terised as unlawful. There were no sanctions on Indo-
nesia. Both organs used the hortatory phrase “calls 
upon” rather than the more robust “demands” or “de-
cides” in asking “the Government of Indonesia to with-
draw without delay” its armed forces from the territo-
ry. There were eight General Assembly resolutions 
concerning East Timor from 1975 to 1982. These were 
adopted with a declining majority of votes. 
Despite the international publicity over the famine, 
the 1979 Resolution contained no specific criticism of 
                                                          
7 NAA: A1838 3038-10-15 Part 11: Portuguese Timor—
Australian Aid. 
Indonesia; instead it called upon “all parties con-
cerned” to facilitate the entry of international relief aid 
“in order to alleviate the suffering of the people of East 
Timor”. Without even mentioning which country was 
responsible, it expressed its “deepest concern at the 
suffering of the people of East Timor”. Indeed, the 
1979 Resolution dropped all references to Article 2, 
paragraph 4 (requiring states to refrain from the 
“threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or national independence of any State”) and Article 11, 
paragraph 3 (referring to “situations which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security”) of the UN 
Charter, which had appeared in previous resolutions. 
The 1979 Resolution did not reaffirm previous resolu-
tions in the preamble or in the operative part. It made 
no reference to East Timor’s territorial integrity.  
FRETILIN’s representative at the UN, Jose Ramos-
Horta, had deliberately weakened the language of the 
1979 General Assembly Resolution (Resolution 34/40 
of 21 November 1979) so as to arrest the declining per-
centage of Yes votes. The tactic was temporarily suc-
cessful, as Table 1 shows. 
Table 1. General Assembly votes, 1975−1982. 
Year  Yes No Abstain Not 
Present 
Percentage 
Voting Yes 
1975 72 10 43 19 50% 
1976 68 20 49 9 47% 
1977 67 26 47 9 45% 
1978 59 31 44 16 39% 
1979 62 31 45 14 41% 
1980 58 35 46 15 38% 
1981 54 42 46 15 34% 
1982 50 46 50 11 32% 
The United States, Britain and France did not support 
any General Assembly resolutions from 1975 to 1982. 
As Permanent Members of the Security Council, they 
had the ability to make a difference but did not do so. 
The US’s position was subsequently explained by its 
Ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his 
memoirs: 
The United States wished things to turn out as they 
did, and worked to bring this about. The Depart-
ment of State desired that the United Nations 
prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it 
undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried 
it forward with no inconsiderable success (Moyni-
han, 1978, p. 279). 
Only about one-third of the UN General Assembly, 
largely Third World states, kept the question of East 
Timor alive in the General Assembly from 1976 until 
1982, when the matter was delegated to the UN Secre-
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tary-General. Only four Western states (Cyprus, 
Greece, Iceland and Portugal) supported East Timor in 
this period. 
When it occupied East Timor, the Indonesian gov-
ernment would not be opposed by the Non-Aligned 
Movement, of which it was a founding member. Nor 
would it be opposed by the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference, since it had the largest Muslim population 
in the world. It was also the largest state in the Associ-
ation of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose 
members’ policy of non-interference in one another’s 
internal affairs meant that Indonesia was free from any 
criticism of its conduct in East Timor.  
7. Not Looking Away  
Even today, a popular but erroneous belief is that the 
United States looked away when Indonesia was killing 
East Timorese by the thousands. According to a Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book by a prominent scholar/diplomat, 
“When its ally, the oil-producing, anti-Communist In-
donesia, invaded East Timor, killing between 100,000 
and 200,000 civilians, the United States looked away” 
(Power, 2002, pp. 146-147). In fact, the United States 
did not look away but provided military, financial and 
diplomatic support to Indonesia during the early years 
of the invasion and for much of the occupation. George 
Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser in the State Department, 
admitted that the Indonesian forces that invaded East 
Timor “were armed roughly 90 per cent with our 
equipment” (US Congress, 1977, pp. 59-64). As Indone-
sia’s napalm-enabled airpower offensives began in 
1977, the US military aid proposal totaled $51.9 mil-
lion8. Later that year, a western diplomat reported that 
Indonesian forces were “running out of military inven-
tory. The operations on Timor have pushed them to 
the wall” (McArthur, 1977). The Carter administration 
helped them replenish their arsenal by authorizing 
weapons sales of $112 million for fiscal year 1978 
(Nevins, 2005, p. 53). Vice-President Walter Mondale 
then flew to Jakarta and announced the sale of A-4 
Skyhawk ground-attack aircraft to the Indonesian Air 
Force (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, pp. 191-192). Accord-
ing to declassified Australian intelligence reports, the 
Suharto regime received “the greater part of her military 
aid from the US, and the remainder from Australia”9. In-
donesia acquired foreign equipment as Table 2 shows. 
The US provided Indonesia with military aid in the 
form of direct grants, credit sales and transfer from ex-
cess stocks. From 1967–1975, US military aid was 
US$104 million. In addition, it sold Indonesia other 
equipment commercially, outside the aid program. The 
military assistance was unaffected by Indonesia’s inva-
sion of East Timor. Australia provided military 
                                                          
8 NAA: A13685 12/1976: Military Study—Indonesia, Part 1.  
9 NAA: A13685, 12/1976: Military Study—Indonesia, Part 1. 
aid―mainly in the form of equipment―in a series of 
three-year programs: A$26 million from July 1972 to 
June 1975 and A$31 million from July 1975 to June 
197810.  
Table 2. Foreign military transfers. 
Armaments Country of origin 
V-150 armoured cars, C-130 
(Hercules) transport aircraft, F-
51 (Mustang) ground-attack 
aircraft, OV-10F (Bronco) 
ground-attack aircraft, T-33 
(Shooting Star) trainer aircraft, 
T-34C (Turbomentor) trainer 
aircraft, Bell 204 and 205 
(Iroquois) helicopters, UH-34-D 
(Choctaw) helicopters, F-5E, F-
5F and A-4 (Skyhawk) aircraft 
USA 
Patrol boats, Sabre and Nomad 
aircraft, Sioux helicopters 
Australia 
Fokker F-27 (Troopship) 
transport aircraft, three 
corvettes. 
The Netherlands 
At least sixteen BO-105 
(Bolkow) helicopters, two 
submarines.  
West Germany 
CASA-212 light transport 
aircraft 
Spain 
Puma helicopters, 
Refurbishment of AMX-13 light 
tanks 
France 
Decca air-defence radars; Hawk 
aircraft (on order). 
UK 
8. Warning of the Famine―The Church in East Timor 
The use of the word “genocide” to characterise the sit-
uation in East Timor appeared in a letter from a Catho-
lic priest smuggled out by Sister Natalia Granado 
Moreira and Sister Maria Auxiliadora Hernandez, who 
had been Dominican missionaries in East Timor. The 
letter was translated from the Portuguese and pub-
lished in Nation Review in January 1978: 
The war is entering its third year and it seems it 
won’t stop soon. The barbarities (understandable in 
the stone age), the cruelties, the theft, the firing 
squads without any justification, are now part of 
everyday life in Timor. The insecurity is total and 
the terror of being arrested is our daily bread. (I’m 
on the list of the persona non grata―any day they 
might make me disappear.) Fretilin troops who sur-
render are shot dead: for them there are no 
                                                          
10 NAA: A13685 12/1976: Military Study—Indonesia, Part 1. 
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jails….Our residence, Bispo Medeiros, was de-
stroyed by the fire of the invaders, Dare seminary 
destroyed, the Catholic colleges of Maliana and 
Soibada destroyed. Timor was not integrated. It 
was annexed. It was not liberated from “com-
munism”. It was given to Islamic Indonesians. Free-
dom in any form does not exist….The world ignores 
us and it is a pity. We are on the way to a genocide 
(Hurst, 1978, p. 9). 
9. Knowledge of the Famine―New Zealand Diplomats  
In the same month as the priest’s letter was published, 
the New Zealand Ambassador to Indonesia paid a visit 
to East Timor (Leadbeater, 2006). He said that “in the 
words of one Catholic priest, ‘everything was taken 
away’ by the Indonesian troops.” But he made allow-
ances for this, commenting that this was “hardly sur-
prising, of course. Indonesian troops have behaved 
badly in many of the outer provinces during the last 25 
years, and at the present time they are displaying a 
marked lack of understanding in Irian Jaya.” Over the 
course of his visit, he wrote, “we found ourselves plac-
ing less and less reliance” on the views of the Catholic 
clergy. He reported that “providing emergency ac-
commodation and food supplies for the refugees is a 
huge problem for the administration at the present 
time, and one which will continue for some while”. At 
Suai, in the south, he reported seeing a “make-shift 
camp which had been hastily erected when some 8,000 
had come down from the hills only a few weeks before. 
This was little more than palm frond bivouacs which 
had been built by the refugees themselves, with assis-
tance from the local people and the local military or-
ganisations”. Rather than ring alarm bells, however, he 
wrote that it was “the price of success: if people were 
not breaking away from the FRETILIN activists there 
would be no refugees.”  
Positively disposed towards his Indonesian hosts, 
he reported that “the island of Timor is by no means an 
attractive piece of real estate….The Timorese people 
are poor, small, riddled with disease and almost totally 
illiterate, very simple and, we were told again and 
again, ‘primitive’. They are almost completely under 
the influence of their ‘rajas’. Considered as human 
stock they are not at all impressive―and this is some-
thing that one has to think about when judging their 
capacity to take part in an act of self-determination or 
even to perform as responsible citizens of an inde-
pendent country.” 
“We spoke no Portuguese or Tetum,” he reported, 
“while few of the ‘locals’ spoke Bahasa Indonesia, so 
that quite often we had to get interpretation from Te-
tum into Portuguese into Bahasa into English.” He re-
ported that the people he spoke with were “mostly 
administration and administration-connected people” 
because “to achieve much more would have required 
fluency in Portuguese and Tetum and a deliberate ef-
fort to cultivate people who might regard themselves 
as in some degree disaffected”. He said that “the 
FRETILIN propaganda machine has several times ac-
cused the Indonesian Government of mounting a new 
and massive invasion of East Timor”, and admitted that 
“in private senior [Indonesian military] officers have 
acknowledged that a special effort was being made” to 
subdue the resistance. However, he had been assured 
by them that “anyone quitting FRETILIN was being re-
ceived ‘as a brother’…in fact only one FRETILIN activist 
had been captured in the strict sense of the word, a 
squad leader who was taken near Bobonaro, and no-one 
seemed to be quite sure what had happened to him”11. 
10. Knowledge of the Famine―Australian Diplomats  
Under Australian law, the Archives Act provides for the 
declassification of most government documents after 
20 years. But the Australian government has refused to 
declassify its nearly 40-year old Foreign Affairs records 
that would reveal in full its knowledge of the famine. It 
claims that their release would compromise Australia’s 
security, defence or international relations. Legal chal-
lenges and public pressure have ensured the release of 
many documents, however, and what they reveal is 
that Australian diplomats and other government offi-
cials were aware that a major humanitarian catastro-
phe was occurring in East Timor.  
Even before the invasion, the documents show that 
Australian officials concluded that the “Indonesian in-
vasion of Portuguese Timor would be contrary to Arti-
cle 2(3) and (4) of the Charter which provides that in-
ternational disputes shall be settled by peaceful means 
and obliges members to refrain from the threat or use 
of force, against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State”12. However, although of-
ficials believed “Indonesian action would fall into the 
category of outright aggression”13, influential Australi-
an policymakers felt their aim should be to “do our 
best to contain the damage to the Australian/Indonesia 
relationship and act to limit a recrudescence of latent 
hostility to Indonesia in Australia”14. Australian princi-
ples, according to this view, “should be tempered by 
the proximity of Indonesia and its importance to us and 
by the relative unimportance of Portuguese Timor”15. 
Australian officials were given timely and accurate 
                                                          
11 NAA: A1838, 3038-7-1 Part 18: Portuguese Timor: External 
Relations.  
12 NAA: A1838 935-17-3 Part 21, iii: Portuguese Timor: UN 
Fourth Committee. 
13 NAA: A1838 935-17-3 Part 21, iii: Portuguese Timor: UN 
Fourth Committee.  
14 NAA: A10463 801-13-11-10 Part 1: Australian Embassy Ja-
karta correspondence files.   
15 NAA: A10463 801-13-11-10 Part 1: Australian Embassy Ja-
karta correspondence files. 
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advice about the catastrophic famine from highly cred-
ible sources. For example, on 24th May 1978, Australi-
an Ambassador Tom Critchley and First Secretary David 
Irvine called on Indonesian Brigadier-General Adenan, 
Director-General for Foreign Relations and Security in 
Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. Adenan ad-
vised them that supporters of FRETILIN were “suffering 
lack of both ammunition and food.” Those who had 
surrendered recently “were in poor physical condition” 
and “some could not even stand”16. Here was an op-
portunity to offer humanitarian aid directly to the In-
donesian government or to pressure it internationally 
to allow humanitarian aid in. But such aid would not be 
allowed to enter for another 17 months, and the death 
toll mounted.  
A month later (30th June 1978), Ambassador Critch-
ley and Acting Defence Attaché Captain R.J. Whitten 
called on General Mohammad Yusuf, Minister for De-
fence and Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces. 
General Yusuf said that he had “just returned from East 
Timor” and that “one of the biggest problems was the 
270,000 women and children to care for.” The Embassy 
went on to note that “apparently the majority are wom-
en and children who have become separated from their 
menfolk.” The Embassy commented that the figure: 
seems unduly high to us considering that the total 
population of the province is somewhere between 
500,000 and 600,000. But it was repeated….General 
Yusuf has a reputation as a dull and taciturn officer 
but on this occasion he was very forthcoming and 
gave the impression that he was well briefed and in 
command of his subject―East Timor. Although 
other unimportant subjects were mentioned he re-
turned to the East Timor problem17.  
In other words, General Yusuf was saying clearly that a 
major humanitarian catastrophe was occurring in East 
Timor. He said that the assistance of international volun-
tary agencies including the ICRC would be very welcome. 
But there was no follow-up, and the death toll mounted.  
Mr. D. Campbell and Mr. P. Alexander of the Aus-
tralian Embassy visited West Timor from 10–14 August 
1978 in the context of an Indonesian aid proposal. The 
Embassy traveled to Atambua, not far from the East 
Timorese border. Thus, it “presented an opportunity to 
gain some information on the general East Timorese 
situation as well as that existing on the West Timorese 
side of the border”18. They reported that the situation 
in East Timor was:  
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far more severe….[They were shown] some very re-
cent photographs…of the condition of the refugees 
in Bobonaro. The photographs depicted many sick, 
starving and malnourished women and children, typ-
ical of famine scenes throughout the world….The 
condition of the refugees, many of whom had in 
any case arrived in a desperate condition, was ex-
tremely poor. The Indonesian authorities were “do-
ing almost nothing” to alleviate the situation. [They 
heard estimates that] at least 1.5% of the refugees 
were dying monthly and that in some groups the 
death rate was around 8% per month. Asked why 
the Indonesian authorities were not reacting to the 
gravity of the situation, [they were told that] it was 
largely because of the sensitivity of the local mili-
tary commanders to publicity about the critical sit-
uation in many parts of East Timor. [Their inform-
ant] did not believe authorities in Dili were 
informing the central Government about the gravity 
of the problem which had emerged partially as a re-
sult of the Amnesty. For this reason he had written 
recently to General Benny Murdani in Jakarta, in-
forming him of the need for urgent Government as-
sistance. However, all he had received for his trou-
ble was a rap over the knuckles from Dili military 
authorities who had flown to Atambua by helicop-
ter to deliver the reprimand19. 
The Australian officials concluded that “the Indonesian 
Government is not coming to grips with the critical 
condition of many refugees not far from the border 
with West Timor. Whether this is because of sensitivity 
to publicity or logistical problems is unclear, but the 
problem will probably become worse as more weak 
Fretilin followers come out of the hills to take up the 
Presidential amnesty. While, with the aid of interna-
tional agencies, the Government appears to have man-
aged the refugee situation on the western side of the 
border capably, in East Timor itself the situation has 
grown worse over the past twelve months. Unless 
there is firm Government action, people will continue 
to die of hunger…”20. Here was another warning of 
mass deaths―and here, yet again, was inaction as the 
death toll mounted.  
11. Knowledge of the Famine―Other Ambassadors  
The Australian ambassador visited East Timor along 
with nine other foreign ambassadors from 6 to 8 Sep-
tember 1978. The ambassadors were briefed that ap-
proximately 125,000 people had come down from the 
mountains, and that as many as a quarter of them 
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were suffering from cholera, malaria, tuberculosis and 
advanced malnutrition. The Ambassador reported in 
confidence that the visit had been carefully controlled 
by the Indonesian authorities, who were clearly anx-
ious that the tragic plight of many of the refugees seen 
should not be blamed on their administration. The US 
Ambassador Ed Masters agreed, writing that “these 
refugees were being given clothing and food in a show 
obviously set up for our benefit” although this may 
have been the usual procedure, he added. He said they 
were “in a pitiful state. The children had bloated stom-
achs and…many adults suffered from malaria, malnu-
trition and dysentery. There were also some cases of 
TB [tuberculosis]” (Masters, 1978). Many ambassadors 
came away shocked by the condition of the refugees. 
One visitor wrote an eyewitness account. The following 
is an excerpt:  
Every week, scores of starving people, dressed in 
rags that cover only some parts of their bony bod-
ies, drag children with sunken eyes, bloated stom-
achs and ugly leg sores down the tortuous moun-
tain paths to make their way to Indonesian 
rehabilitation centres. Indonesians were handing 
out new clothes to replace their rags. Formed into 
two rows of welcoming humanity they waved red-
and-white Indonesian flags and shouted “selamat 
Datang” to ambassadors visiting them. I could clear-
ly distinguished the newer arrivals from the older 
inhabitants, by their bony legs covered in sores. 
Malnutrition differed only in degree. The women 
swayed weakly, their hands gasping the flags mov-
ing slightly as they mumbled their messages of wel-
come. At a Red Cross station a Timorese woman 
slept on a stretcher on the floor dressed in rags 
with a piece of white cloth protecting her face from 
scores of flies attacking it. A medical aide from Jakar-
ta would occasionally go into the room to fan away 
files from her eyes. The heat was unbearable. She 
had just come down from the hills two days earlier, 
and was suffering from cholera, he told me. The 
head of the district told journalists that 56 refugees 
had died on the march from the hills because of ill-
ness and malnutrition (no one used the word “star-
vation”). The visiting ambassadors were conspicu-
ously moved by the sight. A few shook their heads in 
disbelief. The ambassador of Papua New Guinea, 
Dominic Diya told me: “We are a poor country but I 
have not seen anything like this. I am shocked to see 
the conditions of the refugees” (Chiang, 1978). 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s correspond-
ent in Jakarta, Warwick Beutler, reported on the Am-
bassadors’ visit on Australian national public radio:  
“Some of the Ambassadors were lost for words to 
describe the tragedy of thousands of people emerg-
ing from the mountains of East Timor in appalling 
health. Papua New Guinea’s Ambassador said he’d 
never seen human beings in such a bad state. Aus-
tralia’s Ambassador, Mr Tom Critchley, said their 
condition was deplorable….Canada’s Ambassador, 
Mr Glen Shortliffe, describes it as a major humani-
tarian problem” (ABC, 1978).  
He said that most envoys agreed that “only an interna-
tional relief effort could prevent more people from dy-
ing.” The Australian Embassy in Jakarta sent a cable 
back to Foreign Affairs headquarters in Canberra with 
suggestions on how to deal with questions in Parlia-
ment about this unwelcome publicity. “The people of 
Timor,” it said, “have always been poor and most of 
them seem to have always lived barely above the sub-
sistence line. Infrastructure is practically non-existent 
and the long-term problem is one of development. The 
land is poor, literacy rates are low and there are very 
few skilled workers. The Indonesian Government is 
therefore understandably anxious to ensure that any 
reference to the poor condition of the Timorese should 
make it clear that the problem is not repeat not of Indo-
nesia’s making. In short that East Timor was a poverty 
stricken country before the civil war started. Although 
the basic problem was not repeat not created by the re-
cent civil war, the war exacerbated the position”21.  
It will be recalled that the so-called civil war was 
fomented by Indonesia, lasted only three weeks in Au-
gust 1975, and resulted in total deaths on all sides of 
fewer than 3,000 people. But the Australian Embassy 
was more interested in providing public relations cover 
for the Indonesian authorities. It chose to blame poverty 
and the civil war but did not mention the Indonesian mil-
itary’s use of napalm or its destruction of agricultural ar-
eas and other food sources such as livestock. The Aus-
tralian Ambassador to Indonesia, Tom Critchley, 
explained why Indonesia was unwilling to allow interna-
tional humanitarian assistance to enter East Timor: 
While we obviously should not repeat not say so 
publicly, I believe that the Indonesians may be re-
luctant to seek foreign aid in large quantities in East 
Timor in particular, they are unlikely to want for-
eigners there administering it. If the Timorese are 
to become loyal Indonesians, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment must get the credit for relief and devel-
opment work. The Indonesians may also want to 
avoid any impression that the assistance coming 
from abroad is greater than that coming from Ja-
karta. For this reason, I expect them to remain cau-
tious about accepting foreign assistance22.  
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As the deaths due to the famine continued, the Indo-
nesian military sealed East Timor off from the outside 
world. It continued to deny access to the ICRC, insisting 
that any foreign aid be channeled through the Indone-
sian Red Cross, over whose operations it exercised 
strong control. 
The international relief effort was still more than 
one year away, and the East Timorese population, 
hungry, weakened and ill, continued to die. Mean-
while, on 3 October 1978 the Australian High Commis-
sion in Ottawa, Canada, received a copy of the report 
of the visit to East Timor by the Canadian Ambassador 
to Indonesia. Australian officials described it as “the 
most comprehensive account we have. The paras on 
the displaced persons (22–30) are quite graphic and 
para 33, which compares Indonesia’s receptivity to var-
ious aid donors, including Australian worth reading”23. 
Nevertheless, the Ambassador’s report (Paras 34–35) 
“develop[ed] an argument in favour of the Indonesian 
position at the UN”. Canadian diplomats advised their 
Australian interlocutors that Australia’s intended vote 
on the 1978 General Assembly resolution “would have 
more influence on the Canadian position that the actu-
al content of the resolution”24. Australia did not sup-
port the 1978 Resolution, and the famine continued.  
12. Two Contrasting Civil Society Actions 
As the famine hit hard in 1978, some East Timor cam-
paigners perpetrated a hoax that severely reduced 
their credibility; they falsified an advertisement for the 
OV-10 Bronco aircraft placed in the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review by Rockwell International, the aircraft’s 
manufacturer. The original advertisement featured a 
picture of the Bronco in action and a large caption: 
“the Bronco workhorse: Ask Thailand about it.” They 
replaced “Thailand” with “Timor” and provided it to 
The Age, a major newspaper in Australia, in order to 
publicize US complicity in the Indonesian invasion. 
While the US was certainly complicit, the hoax was un-
covered quickly and the activists’ ploy served only to 
undermine their credibility. Rockwell International’s 
Melbourne office checked with their corporate head-
quarters at the behest of the US Embassy in Australia, 
and was informed that the advertisement was a decep-
tion. The US Embassy issued a statement to the Aus-
tralian media: “We find the purported advertisement 
to be a reprehensible effort to discredit an American 
corporation by the transparent use of a photo-
montage in order to misrepresent what they said in 
one of their advertisements” (Alston, 1978). 
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The Age ran an embarrassed apologia that scorned 
Fretilin’s credibility. It said that the “elaborate hoax” 
was sent in a letter to a sympathiser in Sydney signed 
by Fretilin’s representative at the UN, Jose Ramos-
Horta. The sympathiser, Mr Denis Freney, was “con-
vinced the signature was genuine. Not only that―some 
of the matters raised in the letter indicate that only Mr 
Horta could have written it, he says.” Meanwhile, it re-
ported, Mr Ramos-Horta was unreachable―”said to be 
visiting Cuba with a Fretilin delegation” and “after Cuba 
he would be touring the Caribbean” (Lahey, 1978, p. 2).  
At the same time, however, other campaigners 
were able to establish a high degree of credibility by 
conducting very sharp, accurate analysis of the situa-
tion in East Timor. The best example of this type of 
credibility-enhancing research in 1978 was conducted 
by Arnold Kohen, a US-based volunteer journalist in his 
twenties who spearheaded an energetic and highly ef-
fective campaign of raising public awareness with the 
help of a very small group of scholars. Kohen, who had 
formed the Cornell-Ithaca East Timor Defence Commit-
tee, was the lead writer of an analysis of the causes of 
the famine. The analysis discussed the food shortages, 
the Indonesian offensives and the level of US complicity. 
They sent it in the form of an emergency alert to groups 
and individuals in the USA and overseas. Kohen provided 
Professor Noam Chomsky, the renowned linguist and 
political activist, with a 40 page memo and 100 pages of 
documentation for a chapter in a book, The Political 
Economy of Human Rights. The book, co-authored with 
Edward Herman, gave prominence to East Timor, which 
became a signature issue of Chomsky (Chomsky & Her-
man, 1979). Chomsky’s profile brought the East Timor 
question into universities around the world, informing 
many people about the atrocities and their misrepresen-
tation by governments and the media.  
The 1978 analysis was disseminated after Congres-
sional hearings had been held the previous year on the 
situation in East Timor. The hearings were significant 
because they placed on the record denials by the early 
Carter administration that the situation in East Timor 
continued to be serious. The arguments in the 1978 
appeal and further analyses and questions developed 
from this quarter were highlighted at a December 1979 
Congressional hearing. When the famine became an in-
ternational political issue with starving people coming 
down from the mountains and mass deaths occurring 
in the camps, US officials had a lot of explaining to do 
because they had made it look as though the struggle 
in East Timor had ended.  
13. Explaining the Catastrophe  
In March 1979, the Indonesian military assessed that it 
had achieved its war aims; it had defeated FRETILIN in 
battle and eliminated most of its senior leaders. The 
remnants of the resistance were reduced to a few 
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bands of ill-equipped guerrillas who were confined to 
the mountains, far away from the majority of the popu-
lation in the towns and villages. Accordingly, on 26 
March 1979, the Indonesian government declared that 
East Timor had been pacified. It established Sub-
regional Military Command 164 (Korem 164), which 
was subordinated to the Regional Military Command 
(Kodam), headquartered in Bali. The significance of this 
reorganisation was that it was intended to show that 
East Timor had the same military administrative struc-
ture as Indonesia’s other 26 provinces. 
In April 1979 the Indonesian government permitted 
the ICRC to enter East Timor for the first time in almost 
four years to make a brief and preliminary on-the-spot 
survey. According to an internal United States State 
Department document, “It was not until the spring of 
1979 that the Government of Indonesia felt East Timor 
to be secure enough to permit foreign visitors.” Only 
after receiving the green light from the Indonesian mili-
tary did the US Embassy move to initiate US Govern-
ment disaster assistance. According to the same inter-
nal State Department document, “On June 1, 1979, the 
US Ambassador to Indonesia, Edward Masters, deter-
mined that a disaster of such a magnitude as to war-
rant US Government assistance existed in East Timor” 
(USAID, 1979, p. 1). 
In November 1979, Australia’s Department of For-
eign Affairs acknowledged that there was “increased 
publicity in Australia” and “media criticism of the Indo-
nesian Government for allowing such a situation to de-
velop”. As such, there was “strong public pressure on 
the Government to increase its aid contribution.” It 
prepared a Cabinet submission noting the existence of 
“a substantial humanitarian problem in East Timor. As 
many as 200,000 Timorese are in urgent need of food 
and medical care.” It noted that the ICRC “has faced 
major difficulties both to and within Timor” and that 
“within Timor, transport costs ($3.3 million) represent-
ed a little under one half of the total cost” because 
“places in greatest need are only accessible by air.” 
While the “provision of RAAF [Royal Australian Air 
Force] helicopters is feasible without detriment to cur-
rent commitments” and “could have popular appeal 
within Australia”, they “would be likely to cause 
presentational difficulties for the Indonesians.” For 
that reason it opposed the provision of RAAF helicop-
ters but suggested an offer of two million dollars to the 
Indonesian Government instead25.  
With the prospect of an international relief ef-
fort―and foreign witnesses―the Indonesian govern-
ment developed a narrative to explain the dire situa-
tion. It blamed the famine on the subsistence farming 
practices of the East Timorese and on drought.  
For their part, Australian diplomats prepared “press 
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guidance” so that the Foreign Minister could deal with 
media inquiries about the disaster. The Minister’s 
comments, they wrote, should focus on “the positive 
question of what can usefully be done to help Timorese 
in need and steer them away from sterile analyses of 
past errors, body counts and who is to blame for 
what”26. Drawing on Ambassador Critchley’s September 
1978 cable,27 they blamed the death toll on the civil war: 
“Many died during and because of the civil war before 
Indonesian intervention. Some thousands have left East 
Timor. We do not wish to get into discussions of how 
many died; what matters is helping the living.” Protect-
ing the Indonesian government from international criti-
cism, they said it had “spent a large amount of money 
and effort on developing East Timor. Part of the eco-
nomic problem is that Indonesia has inherited three cen-
turies of colonial neglect….They have had to react to a 
quickly changing situation and are doing their best”28.  
Where were these starving people coming from? 
The US State Department’s explanations resembled 
those advanced by the Indonesian regime. On 4 De-
cember 1979, State Department officials and US am-
bassador to Indonesia Edward Masters testified to the 
US Congress about the famine. The officials showed an 
aversion to the words “famine” and “starvation,” refer-
ring instead to “acute malnutrition.” For his part, Mas-
ters blamed the dire condition of the East Timorese 
people on “slash and burn agriculture,” “extreme 
backwardness,” “prevailing poverty,” “lack of infra-
structure,” “erosion,” and “drought.” He mentioned 
the effects of the war briefly but chose to blame the 
Portuguese, who, as a contemporaneous analysis 
pointed out, “pulled out of their half of the island four 
years ago―and never carpet-bombed or defoliated the 
place” (Kohen & Quance, 1980).  
However, Kohen’s razor-sharp 1978 analysis had al-
ready laid the groundwork for establishing the fact of a 
humanitarian catastrophe, and had squarely identified 
the Indonesian offensives as the causative factor. It 
had also highlighted the level of US complicity. Building 
on the structure of legitimacy created as a result of this 
credibility, Kohen worked intensively for several years 
with journalists and congressional officers, and played 
a crucial role in developing long-term Congressional 
contacts. Much of the pressure exerted on Indonesia in 
1999, when East Timor was finally liberated, arose as a 
result of the structure of legitimacy that was built 
through painstaking efforts in these very important 
constituencies in 1979, the 1980s and the first two 
years of the 1990s, when the Santa Cruz massacre cat-
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apulted East Timor to international prominence (Fer-
nandes, 2011, pp. 63-86).  
14. Preventing Mass Atrocities in East Timor 
This paper has shown that early warning of mass atroc-
ities in East Timor was available; that key states did not 
look away but were well-informed of the unfolding ca-
lamity caused by the Indonesian military’s operations; 
that they provided military and diplomatic assistance 
to Indonesia; and that high-quality research by civil so-
ciety activists did make a difference―not to ending the 
famine but to creating a structure of legitimacy as a re-
sult of this credible research and advocacy. The paper 
thus contributes to scholarship on mass atrocity pre-
vention by showing that―at least in this case―there 
was no “early warning” problem but rather a failure to 
generate the political will to act on these warnings. Un-
til that failure is addressed and early warnings are op-
erationalised into an international commitment to act, 
efforts to end mass atrocities will be challenged by ac-
cusations of illegality, selectivity and cynicism. 
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